Distributed Coalition Formation Games for Secure Wireless Transmission by Walid Saad et al.
Mobile Netw Appl (2011) 16:231–245
DOI 10.1007/s11036-010-0275-1
Distributed Coalition Formation Games for Secure
Wireless Transmission
Walid Saad · Zhu Han · Tamer Bas¸ar ·
Mérouane Debbah · Are Hjørungnes
Published online: 11 November 2010
© The Author(s) 2010. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract Cooperation among wireless nodes has been
recently proposed for improving the physical layer
(PHY) security of wireless transmission in the presence
of multiple eavesdroppers. While existing PHY security
literature answered the question “what are the link-
level secrecy rate gains from cooperation?”, this paper
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attempts to answer the question of “how to achieve
those gains in a practical decentralized wireless net-
work and in the presence of a cost for information ex-
change?”. For this purpose, we model the PHY security
cooperation problem as a coalitional game with non-
transferable utility and propose a distributed algorithm
for coalition formation. Using the proposed algorithm,
the wireless users can cooperate and self-organize into
disjoint independent coalitions, while maximizing their
secrecy rate taking into account the costs during infor-
mation exchange. We analyze the resulting coalitional
structures for both decode-and-forward and amplify-
and-forward cooperation and study how the users can
adapt the network topology to environmental changes
such as mobility. Through simulations, we assess the
performance of the proposed algorithm and show that,
by coalition formation using decode-and-forward, the
average secrecy rate per user is increased of up to
25.3 and 24.4% (for a network with 45 users) relative
to the non-cooperative and amplify-and-forward cases,
respectively.
Keywords physical layer security · coalitional games ·
game theory · secure communication
1 Introduction
With the recent emergence of ad hoc and decentralized
networks, researchers have been seeking alternative
ways to secure wireless transmission while avoiding
the overhead that classical cryptograph may yield. This
effort has led to an increased attention on studying the
ability of the physical layer (PHY) to provide secure
wireless communication. The main idea is to exploit the
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wireless channel PHY characteristics such as fading or
noise for improving the reliability of wireless transmis-
sion. While PHY security is not a substitute for classical
cryptography, it does indeed provide an alternative that
can complement traditional encryption based security
methods and, potentially, ease their implementation in
large scale future wireless networks. For instance, one
key advantage of PHY security is the possibility of
providing, using channel coding and information theo-
retical techniques, guarantees on security (at the phys-
ical layer) irrespective of time or of the computational
resources available at the attacker [1–6]. When dealing
with PHY security, the reliability of a wireless channel
is quantified by the rate of secret information sent
from a wireless node to its destination in the presence
of eavesdroppers, i.e., the so-called secrecy rate. The
maximal achievable secrecy rate is referred to as the
secrecy capacity. The study of this security aspect began
with the pioneering work of Wyner over the wire-tap
channel [1] and was followed up in [2, 3] for the scalar
Gaussian wire-tap channel and the broadcast channel,
respectively.
Recently, there has been a growing interest in car-
rying out these studies unto the wireless and the multi-
user channels [4–11]. For instance, in [4] and [5], the
authors study the secrecy capacity region for both the
Gaussian and the fading broadcast channels and pro-
pose optimal power allocation strategies. In [6], the
secrecy level in multiple access channels from a link-
level perspective is studied. Further, multiple antenna
systems have been proposed in [8] for ensuring a non-
zero secrecy capacity. The work in [9, 10] presents a
performance analysis for using cooperative beamform-
ing (with no cost for cooperation), with decode-and-
forward and amplify-and-forward relaying, to improve
the secrecy rate of a single cluster consisting of one
source node and a number of relays. Moreover, in [11],
the use of friendly jammer nodes has been proposed as
a technique for reducing the effect of the eavesdrop-
pers and improving the secrecy rates of trusted nodes.
Briefly, the majority of the existing literature is de-
voted to the information theoretic analysis of link-level
performance gains of secure communications with no
information exchange cost, notably when a source node
cooperates with some relays as in [9, 10]. While this
literature studied the performance of some cooperative
schemes, no work seems to have investigated how a
number of users, each with its own data, can interact
and cooperate at network-wide level to improve their
secrecy rate.
The main contribution of this work is to propose
distributed cooperation strategies, making use of coali-
tional game theory [12], which allow to study the in-
teractions between a network of users that seek to
secure their communication in the presence of multiple
eavesdroppers. Another major contribution is to study
the impact on the network topology and dynamics of
the inherent tradeoff that exists between the PHY
security cooperation gains in terms of secrecy rate
and the information exchange costs. In other words,
while the earlier work answered the question of “what
are the secrecy rate gains from cooperation?”, here, we
seek to answer the question of “how to achieve those
gains in a practical decentralized wireless network and
in the presence of a cost for information exchange?”.
We model the problem as a non-transferable coali-
tional game and propose a distributed algorithm for
autonomous coalition formation based on well suited
concepts from cooperative games. Through the pro-
posed algorithm, each user autonomously decides to
form or break a coalition for maximizing its utility in
terms of secrecy rate while accounting for the loss of se-
crecy rate during information exchange. We show that
independent disjoint coalitions form in the network,
due to the cooperation cost, and we study their proper-
ties for both the decode-and-forward and amplify-and-
forward cooperation models. Simulation results show
that, by coalition formation using decode-and-forward,
the average secrecy rate per user is increased by up
to 25.3 and 24.4% relative to the non-cooperative and
amplify-and-forward cases, respectively. Further, the
results show how the users can self-organize and adapt
the topology to mobility. Note that, this paper is an
extension of the previous conference version in [25].
The rest of this paper is organized as follows:
Section 2 presents the system model. Section 3 presents
the game formulation and properties. In Section 4 we
devise the coalition formation algorithm. Simulation
results are presented and analyzed in Section 5. Finally,
conclusions are drawn in Section 6.
2 System model
Consider a network having N transmitters (e.g. mo-
bile users) sending data to M receivers (destinations)
in the presence of K eavesdroppers that seek to tap
into the transmission of the users. Users, receivers
and eavesdroppers are unidirectional-single-antenna
nodes. We defineN = {1, . . . , N},M = {1, . . . , M} and
K = {1, . . . , K} as the sets of users, destinations, and
eavesdroppers, respectively. We consider only the case
of multiple eavesdroppers, hence, we have K > 1 al-
though the case of a single eavesdropper can be easily
accommodated. Furthermore, let hi,mi denote the com-
plex baseband channel gain between user i ∈ N and its
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destination mi ∈M and gi,k denote the channel gain
between user i ∈ N and eavesdropper k ∈ K. We con-





with di,mi the distance between user i and its destination
mi, μ the pathloss exponent, and φi,mi the phase offset.
A similar model is also used for the user-eavesdropper
channel.
In this model, we consider that the transmitters in
N are all trusted and they are aware of the presence of
malicious nodes, i.e., the eavesdroppers inK. Further, it
is considered that the nodes are aware of their channel
to their destination and to the eavesdroppers, which is
an assumption commonly used in most PHY security
related literature [1–10] (and references therein). For
the considered channel model, as the nodes are aware
of the eavesdroppers’ and receivers’ locations, they
can estimate the channels. We note that the model,
algorithm, and analysis of this paper can readily ac-
commodate other channel models, subject to, however,
modification of some practical aspects. For example,
for rapidly varying channels, the nodes may be required
to perform advanced signal processing techniques such
as those in [13], in order to acquire estimates of the
channels to the eavesdroppers and the destinations.
The proposed model is motivated by various prac-
tical applications for physical layer security. For ex-
ample, the eavesdroppers can be thought of as areas
where the trusted transmitters suspect the presence
of malicious nodes, and, hence, they seek to make
sure that no eavesdropping is done through these loca-
tions. Such a model is, for example, applicable in the
battlefield where nodes belonging to a certain party
attempt to secure certain locations suspected of ex-
hibiting malicious behavior. Another possible scenario
is the case where the wireless nodes engage in coop-
eration only with other nodes that have authenticated
with the network, e.g., through a database such as the
HLR/VLR of 3G/4G wireless systems, while assuming
that all other nodes, i.e., unauthenticated nodes, are
malicious eavesdroppers. Hence, the proposed model is
suited to several potential scenarios. Further, we note
that, our current analysis can also serve to provide
an upper bound for future work where the analysis
pertaining to the case where the eavesdropper’ identity
and their locations are not known will be tackled (in
that case although the cooperation model needs to be
modified and a trust scheme needs to be integrated, the
PHY security coalitional game model presented in the
following sections can be readily applied).
For multiple access, we consider a TDMA transmis-
sion, whereby, in a non-cooperative manner, each user
occupies a single time slot. Within a single slot, the
amount of reliable information transmitted from the
user i occupying the slot to its destination mi is quan-









where Cdi,mi is the capacity for the transmission between
user i and its destination mi ∈M, Cei,k is the capacity of
user i at the eavesdropper k ∈ K, and a+  max (a, 0).
Note that the secrecy rate in Eq. 1 is shown to be
achievable in [14] using Gaussian inputs.
In a non-cooperative approach, due to the broad-
cast nature of the wireless channel, the transmission
of the users can be overheard by the eavesdroppers,
which reduces their secrecy rate as clearly expressed in
Eq. 1. For improving their performance and increasing
their secrecy rate, the users can collaborate by forming
coalitions. Within every coalition, the users can utilize
collaborative beamforming techniques for improving
their secrecy rates. In this context, every user i member
of a coalition S can cooperate with its partners in S by
dividing its slot into two durations:
1. In the first duration, user i broadcasts its data to the
other members of coalition S.
2. In the second duration, coalition S performs col-
laborative beamforming. Thus, all the members of
coalition S relay a weighted version of user i’s signal
to its destination.
Although finding an optimal cooperation scheme that
maximizes the secrecy rate is quite complex [9], one
approach for cooperation is to null the signal at the
eavesdroppers, i.e., impose Cei,k = 0,∀k ∈ K, hence, im-
proving their secrecy rate as compared to the non-
cooperative rate in Eq. 1 [9]. Each coalition S ⊆ N
that forms in the network is able to transmit within
all the time slots previously held by its users. Thus,
in the presence of cooperating coalitions, the TDMA
system schedules one coalition per time slot. During
a given slot, the coalition acts as a single entity for
transmitting the data of the user that owns the slot.
Figure 1 shows an illustration of this model for N =
9 users, M = 2 destinations, and K = 2 eavesdroppers.
Furthermore, we define a fixed transmit power per
time slot P˜ which constrains all the users that are
transmitting within a given slot. In a non-cooperative
manner, this power constraint applies to the single user
occupying the slot, while in the cooperative case this
same power constraint applies to the entire coali-
tion occupying the slot. Such an assumption is quite
common [15–17], whereby a power constraint per
slot is considered to apply to the total power of all
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Fig. 1 System model for
physical layer security
coalitional game
transmitters in this slot. The main rationale for such
a condition is that, on the average, due to varying
users’ locations (or channels), the users will experience
fluctuations of their transmit power which will be com-
pensated by other users in the same coalition so as
to meet fixed constraint per slot. For every coalition
S, during the time slot owned by user i ∈ S, user i
utilizes a portion of the available power P˜ for informa-
tion exchange (first stage) while the remaining portion
PSi is used by the coalition S to transmit the actual
data to the destination mi of user i (second stage).
For information exchange, user i ∈ S can broadcast its
information to the farthest user iˆ ∈ S, by doing so all the
other members of S can also obtain the information due
to the broadcast nature of the wireless channel. This
information exchange incurs a power cost P¯i,iˆ given by
P¯i,iˆ =
ν0 · σ 2
|qi,iˆ|2
, (2)
where ν0 is a target average signal-to-noise ratio (SNR)
for information exchange, σ 2 is the noise variance and
qi,iˆ is the channel gain between users i and iˆ. The
remaining power that coalition S utilizes for the trans-
mission of the data of user i during the remaining time






For every coalition S, during the transmission of the
data of user i to its destination, the coalition members
can cooperate, using either decode-and-forward (DF)
or amplify-and-forward (AF), and, hence, weight their
signals in a way to completely null the signal at the
eavesdroppers. In DF, the basic idea is that, once the
coalition members that are acting as relays decode the
noisy signal that was received in the information ex-
change phase from the source, they re-encode this sig-
nal before performing beamforming, i.e., transmitting a
weighted version of the re-encoded signal. In contrast,
for AF, in the first phase, the coalition members that
are acting as relays do not decode the noisy signal,
instead, they perform beamforming by weighting the
noisy version of the signal received during the informa-
tion exchange phase and transmitting it. Hence, while
in DF the relays decode the signal and re-encode it and,
then, transmit a weighted signal of the re-encoded ver-
sion, in AF, the relays weight the entire received signal,
i.e., including the noise, and then transmit this weighted
version. Thus, although DF can provide a better perfor-
mance, AF is less complex due to the unnecessary need
for decoding and re-encoding the signal. We refer to
[9, 10, 18, 19] and references therein for a detailed and
exhaustive description of applications and additional
aspects of DF and AF relaying, which are out of the
scope of this paper. Further, for any coalition S the
signal weights and the “user-destination” channels are
represented by the |S| × 1 vectors wS = [wi1, . . . , wi|S| ]H
and hS = [hi1,m1 , . . . , hi|S|,m|S| ]H , respectively.
By nulling the signals at the eavesdropper through
DF cooperation within coalition S, the secrecy rate
achieved by user i ∈ S at its destination mi during user















where RS = hShHS , σ 2 is the noise variance, and w∗,DFS
is the weight vector that maximizes the secrecy rate
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while nulling the signal at the eavesdropper with DF
cooperation and can be found using [9, Eq. 20]. In Eq. 4,
the factor 12 accounts for the fact that half of the slot of
user i is reserved for information exchange.
For AF, we define, during the transmission slot of a
user i ∈ S member of a coalition S, the |S| × 1 vector aiS
with every element aiS, j =
√
P¯i,iˆqi, jh j,m j, ∀ j = i (qi, j is
the channel between users i and j and P¯i,iˆ is the power
used by user i for information exchange as per Eq. 2)
and aiS,i =
√
P¯i,iˆhi,mi and the |S| × |S| diagonal matrix
U iS with every diagonal element u
i
S, j, j = |h j,m j|2 ∀ j = i
and uiS,i,i = 0. Given these definitions and by nulling the
signals at the eavesdropper through AF cooperation
within coalition S, the secrecy rate achieved by user i ∈


















S + 1)σ 2
)
, (5)
where Ra = aiS(aiS)H , and w∗,AFS is the weight vector
that maximizes the secrecy rate while nulling the signal
at the eavesdropper with AF cooperation and can be
found using [10, Eqs. 14, 15]. Note that for AF, as seen
in Eq. 5, there is a stronger dependence on the chan-
nels (through the matrix Ra) between the cooperating
users in both the first and second phase of cooperation,
unlike in DF, where this dependence is solely through
the power in Eq. 2 during the information exchange
phase. Further, for AF, as the cooperating users am-
plify a noisy version of the signal, the noise is also
amplified, which can reduce the cooperation gains, as




Further, it must be stressed that, although the mod-
els for AF and DF cooperation in Eqs. 4 and 5 are
inspired from [9, 10], our work and contribution differ
significantly from [9, 10]. While the work in [9, 10] is
solely dedicated to finding the optimal weights in Eqs. 4
and 5, and presenting a link-level performance analysis
for a single cluster of neighboring nodes with no cost
for cooperation, our work seeks to perform a network-
level analysis by modeling the interactions among a
network of users that seek to cooperate, in order to
improve their performance, using either the DF or AF
protocols in the presence of costs for information ex-
change. Hence, the main focus of this paper is modeling
the user’s behavior, studying the network dynamics and
topology, and analyzing the network-level aspects of
cooperation in PHY security problems. In this regard,
the remainder of this paper is devoted to an investiga-
tion of how a network of users can cooperate, through
the protocols described in this section, and improve the
security of their wireless transmission, i.e., their secrecy
rate.
Finally, note that, although the proposed model con-
sidered TDMA transmission for multiple access, the
algorithm and coalitional game formulation can be ex-
tended to accommodate other schemes as well, such
as FDMA or CSMA. Nonetheless, when considering
alternative multiple access schemes, one must modify
accordingly the benefits and costs from cooperation,
in order to capture the properties of the considered
multiple access protocol.
3 Physical layer security as a coalitional game
The proposed PHY security problem can be modeled
as an (N , V) coalitional game with a non-transferable
utility [12, 20] where V is a mapping such that for every
coalition S ⊆ N , V(S) is a closed convex subset of R|S|
that contains the payoff vectors that players in S can
achieve. Thus, given a coalition S and denoting by φi(S)
the payoff of user i ∈ S during its time slot, we define
the coalitional value set, i.e., the mapping V, as follows
V(S) = {φ(S) ∈ R|S|| ∀i ∈ S φi(S) = (vi(S) − ci(S))+
if PSi > 0, and φi(S) = −∞ otherwise.},
(6)
where vi(S) = CSi,mi is the gain in terms of secrecy rate
for user i ∈ S given by Eq. 4 while taking into account
the available power PSi in Eq. 3 and ci(S) is a cost
function that captures the loss for user i ∈ S, in terms of
secrecy rate, that occurs during information exchange.
Note that, when all the power is spent for information
exchange, the payoff φi(S) of user i is set to −∞ since, in
this case, the user has clearly no interest in cooperating.
With regard to the secrecy cost function ci(S), when a
user i ∈ S sends its information to the farthest user iˆ ∈ S
using a power level P¯i,iˆ, the eavesdroppers can overhear
the transmission. This security loss is quantified by the
rate at the eavesdroppers resulting from the informa-
tion exchange and which, for a particular eavedropper
k ∈ K, is given by Cˆei,k = 12 log (1 +
P¯i,iˆ·|gi,k|2
σ 2
) and the cost
function c(S) can be defined as
ci(S) = max (Cˆei,1, . . . , Cˆei,K). (7)
In general, coalitional game based problems seek to
characterize the properties and stability of the grand
coalition of all players since it is generally assumed that
the grand coalition maximizes the utilities of the players
[20]. In our case, although cooperation improves the
secrecy rate as per Eq. 6 for the users in the TDMA
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network; the utility in Eq. 6 also accounts for two types
of cooperation costs:(i)- The fraction of power spent for
information exchange as per Eq. 3 and, (ii) the secrecy
loss during information exchange as per Eq. 7 which can
strongly limit the cooperation gains. Therefore, for the
proposed (N , v) coalitional game we have:
Property 1 For the proposed (N , V) coalitional game,
the grand coalition of all the users seldom forms due
to the various costs for information exchange. Instead,
disjoint independent coalitions will form in the network.
Proof Given a number of users positioned at different
locations within the wireless network, cooperation for
improving the secrecy rate entails costs, as previously
mentioned, in terms of secrecy loss and power loss dur-
ing information exchange as per Eqs. 2 and 7. Hence, in
a practical wireless network where the users are located
at different positions, it is highly likely that, when they
attempt to cooperate for forming the grand coalitionN
of all users, either: (i)- there exists a pair of users i, j ∈
N that are distant enough to require an information
power cost of P˜, and hence they have no incentive to
join the grand coalition, or (ii)- there exists a user i ∈ N
with payoff in the grand coalition φi(N ) = 0 due to the
secrecy loss as captured by Eq. 7, hence this user i has
incentive to deviate from the grand coalition. Clearly,
by accounting for the various cooperation costs, the
grand coalition of all users will seldom form (it only
forms if all users are very close, which is unrealistic in
a large scale wireless network) and hence, the network
structure consists of disjoint independent coalitions.
	unionsq
Due to this property, traditional solution concepts
for coalitional games, such as the core [20], may not be
applicable [12]. In fact, in order for the core to exist,
as a solution concept, a coalitional game must ensure
that the grand coalition, i.e., the coalition of all players
will form. However, as seen in Fig. 1 and corroborated
by Property 1, in general, due to the cost for coalition
formation, the grand coalition will not form. Instead, in-
dependent and disjoint coalitions appear in the network
as a result of the collaborative beamforming process.
In this regard, the proposed game is classified as a
coalition formation game [12], and the objective is to
find the coalitional structure that will form in the net-
work, instead of finding only a solution concept, such
as the core, which aims mainly at stabilizing the grand
coalition.
Furthermore, for the proposed (N , V) coalition for-
mation game, a constraint on the coalition size, imposed
by the nature of the cooperation protocol exists as
follows:
Remark 1 For the proposed (N , V) coalition formation
game, the size of any coalition S ⊆ N that will form in
the network must satisfy |S| > K for both DF and AF
cooperation.
This is a direct result of the fact that, for nulling
K eavesdroppers, at least K + 1 users must cooperate,
otherwise, no weight vector can be found to maximize
the secrecy rate while nulling the signal at the eaves-
droppers.
4 Distributed Coalition formation algorithm
4.1 Coalition formation algorithm
Coalition formation has recently attracted increased at-
tention in game theory [12, 21, 22]. The goal of coalition
formation games is to find algorithms for characterizing
the coalitional structures that form in a network where
the grand coalition is not optimal. For constructing a
coalition formation process suitable to the proposed
(N , V) PHY security cooperative game, we require the
following definitions [12, 22]:
Definition 1 A collection of coalitions, denoted by S, is
defined as the set S = {S1, . . . , Sl} of mutually disjoint
coalitions Si ⊂ N . In other words, a collection is any
arbitrary group of disjoint coalitions Si of N not neces-
sarily spanning all players of N . If the collection spans
all the players of N ; that is ⋃lj=1 S j = N , the collection
is a partition of N .
Definition 2 A preference operator or comparison re-
lation  is an order defined for comparing two col-
lectionsR = {R1, . . . , Rl} and S = {S1, . . . , Sp} that are
partitions of the same subset A ⊆ N (i.e. same players
in R and S). Therefore, R S implies that the way R
partitions A is preferred to the way S partitions A.
For the proposed PHY security coalition formation
game, an individual value order, i.e. an order which
compares the individual payoffs of the users, is needed
due to the non-transferable utility of the game. For this
purpose, for the proposed game, we utilize the follow-
ing order for defining the preferences of the users:
Definition 3 Consider two collections R =
{R1, . . . , Rl} and S = {S1, . . . , Sm} that are partitions
Mobile Netw Appl (2011) 16:231–245 237
Algorithm 1 One round of the proposed PHY security coalition
formation algorithm
Initial State
The network is partitioned by T = {T1, . . . , Tk} (At the be-
ginning of all time T = N = {1, . . . , N} with non-cooperative
users).
Phase 1 - Neighbor Discovery:
a) Each coalition surveys its neighborhood for candidate
partners using techniques from [23, 24].
b) For every coalition Ti, the candidate partners lie in the
area represented by the intersection of |Ti| circles with
centers j ∈ Ti and radii determined by the distance where
the power for information exchange does not exceed P˜ for
any user (computed by Eq. 2).
Phase 2 - Adaptive Coalition Formation:
In this phase, coalition formation using merge-and-split
occurs.
repeat
A) F = Merge(T ); coalitions in T decide to merge as
follows (more details of the merge are in Section 4.1):
a) Each coalition Ti ∈ T elects a coalition head k ∈ Ti
to perform negotiations with the neighbors for merge.
b) Sequentially, for each coalition Ti ∈ T that is at-
tempting to merge:
b.1) Coalition head k ∈ Ti exchanges, over a control
channel with the neighbors, the details of their mem-
bers, e.g., channel estimates, capabilities, and loca-
tions.
b.2) Coalition head k ∈ Ti, ∀Ti ∈ T uses the gathered
information to find a group of coalitions to merge
with. For doing so, the coalition head enumerates,
sequentially, the possible coalitions, of size greater
than K (see Remark 1), that it can form with the
neighbors that were discovered in Phase 1. This enu-
meration stops when the head finds a suited coalition
to merge with.
b.3) Coalition head k ∈ Ti signals an intent to cooper-
ate to the coalitions with whom it is interested to
merge and which verify the Pareto order.
b.4) Coalition head k will receive an approval to
merge, and, subsequently, the merge operation is
jointly performed by all concerned coalitions.
B) T = Split(F); coalitions in F decide to split based on
the Pareto order as follows:
a) The members of each coalition coordinate internally
and attempt to assess whether any split form can be
found to satisfy the Pareto order.
b) As the members are part of the same coalition,
assessing the payoffs yielded by a split form is easily
performed since the members are aware of the identi-
ties and characteristics of their partners.
until Merge-and-split terminates.
Phase 3 - Secure Transmission:
Each coalition’s users exchange their information and
transmit their data within their allotted slots using DF or
AF techniques in [9, 10, 18, 19].
The above three phases are repeated periodically during the
network operation, allowing a topology that is adaptive to
environmental changes such as mobility.
of the same subset A ⊆ N (same players in R and
S). For a collection R = {R1, . . . , Rl}, let the utility
of a player j in a coalition R j ∈ R be denoted by
 j(R) = φ j(R j) ∈ V(R j). R is preferred over S by
Pareto order, written asR S, iff
R S ⇐⇒ { j(R) ≥  j(S) ∀ j ∈ R,S},
with at least one strict inequality (>) for a player k.
In other words, a collection is preferred by the play-
ers over another collection, if at least one player is able
to improve its payoff without hurting the other play-
ers. Subsequently, for performing autonomous coali-
tion formation between the users in the proposed PHY
security game, we construct a distributed algorithm
based on two simple rules denoted as “merge” and
“split” [12, 22] defined as follows:
Definition 4 Merge Rule - Merge any set of coalitions
{S1, . . . , Sl} whenever the merged form is preferred by
the players, i.e., where {⋃lj=1 S j}  {S1, . . . , Sl}, there-
fore, {S1, . . . , Sl} → {⋃lj=1 S j}.
Definition 5 Split Rule - Split any coalition
⋃l
j=1 S j
whenever a split form is preferred by the players,
i.e., where {S1, . . . , Sl}  {⋃lj=1 S j}, thus, {⋃lj=1 S j} →
{S1, . . . , Sl}.
Using the above rules, multiple coalitions can merge
into a larger coalition if merging yields a preferred
collection based on the Pareto order. This implies that
a group of users can agree to form a larger coalition, if
at least one of the users improves its payoff without de-
creasing the utilities of any of the other users. Similarly,
an existing coalition can decide to split into smaller
coalitions if splitting yields a preferred collection by
Pareto order. The rationale behind these rules is that,
once the users agree to sign a merge agreement, this
agreement can only be broken if all the users approve.
This is a family of coalition formation games known
as “coalition formation games with partially reversible
agreements” [21]. Using the rules of merge and split
is highly suitable for the proposed PHY security game
due to many reasons. For instance, each merge or split
decision can be taken in a distributed manner by each
individual user or by each already formed coalition.
Further, it is shown in [22] that any arbitrary iteration
of merge and split rules terminates, hence, these rules
can be used as building blocks in a coalition formation
process for the PHY security game.
Accordingly, for the proposed PHY security game,
we construct a coalition formation algorithm based on
merge-and-split. Each run of the proposed algorithm
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consists of three phases: Neighbor discovery, adaptive
coalition formation, and transmission, and is summa-
rized in Algorithm 1. In the neighbor discovery phase
(Phase 1), each coalition (or user) surveys its environ-
ment in order to find possible cooperation candidates.
For a coalition Sk the area that is surveyed for discov-
ery is the intersection of |Sk| circles, centered at the
coalition members with each circle’s radius given by the
maximum distance r¯i (for the circle centered at i ∈ Sk)
within which the power cost for user i as given by Eq. 2
does not exceed the total available power P˜. This area
is determined by the fact that, if a number of coalitions
{S1, . . . , Sm} attempt to merge into a new coalition G =
∪mi=1Si which contains a member i ∈ G such that the
power for information exchange needed by i exceeds
P˜, then the payoff of i goes to −∞ as per Eq. 6 and
the Pareto order can never be verified. Clearly, as the
number of users in a coalition increases, the number
of circles increases, reducing the area where possible
cooperation partners can be found. This implies that,
as the size of a coalition grows, the possibility of adding
new users decreases, and, hence, the complexity of
performing merge also decreases.
Following Phase 1, the adaptive coalition formation
phase (Phase 2) begins, whereby the users interact for
assessing whether to form new coalitions with their
neighbors or whether to break their current coalition.
For this purpose, an iteration of sequential merge-and-
split rules occurs in the network, whereby each coali-
tion decides to merge (or split) depending on the utility
improvement that merging (or splitting) yields. Starting
from an initial network partition T = {T1, . . . , Tl} ofN ,
the first step in the merge process is that, for every
coalition Ti ∈ T a coalition head is selected in order
to handle the merge part of coalition formation. Over
time, the head of a coalition can change in a round
robin fashion for example. Subsequently, any random
coalition (individual user) can start with the merge
process. The coalition head k of a coalition Ti ∈ T
which debuts the merge process starts by gathering,
over a control channel, some information on the char-
acteristics of neighboring coalitions, e.g., channel esti-
mates, locations, and capabilities. Subsequently, using
the gathered information, the coalition head begins
enumerating, sequentially, the possible coalitions, of
size greater than K (Remark 1), that it can form with
the neighbors that were discovered in Phase 1. On one
hand, if a new coalition T˜i which is preferred by the
users through Pareto order is identified, this coalition
will form by a merge agreement of all its members as
described in Algorithm 1. Hence, the merge ends by a
final merged coalition Tfinali composed of Ti and one or
several of coalitions in its vicinity. On the other hand,
if Ti is unable to merge with any of the discovered
partners, it ends its search and Tfinali = Ti.
The algorithm is repeated for the remaining Ti ∈ T
until all the coalitions have made their merge deci-
sions, resulting in a final partition F . Following the
merge process, the coalitions in the resulting partition
F are next subject to split operations, if any is possible.
Since the split operation involves members of the same
coalition, the coalition members can easily coordinate
and attempt to assess whether any split form can be
found to satisfy the Pareto order. Note that, in the
proposed PHY security problem, the coalitions are only
interested in splitting into structures that include either
singleton users or coalitions of size larger than K or
both (Remark 1). Unlike the merge, the split is a local
decision to each coalition. An iteration consisting of
multiple successive merge-and-split operations is re-
peated until it terminates. The termination of an iter-
ation of merge and split rules is guaranteed as shown in
[22]. It must be stressed that the merge or split decisions
can be taken in a distributed way by the users/coalitions
without relying on any centralized entity.
In the final transmission phase (Phase 3), the coali-
tions exchange their information and begin their secure
transmission towards their corresponding destinations,
in a TDMA manner, one coalition per slot. Every slot
is owned by a user who transmits its data with the
help of its coalition partners, if that user belongs to
a coalition. Hence, in this phase, the user performs
the actual beamforming, while transmitting the data of
every user within its corresponding slot. For performing
beamforming using DF or AF, any of the practical
algorithms in [18, 19] can be adopted. As time evolves
and the users, eavesdroppers and destinations move (or
new users or eavesdroppers enter/leave the network),
the users can autonomously self-organize and adapt the
network’s topology through appropriate merge-and-
split decisions during Phase 2. This adaptation to envi-
ronmental changes is ensured by enabling the users to
run the adaptive coalition formation phase periodically
in the network.
The proposed Algorithm 1 can be implemented in a
distributed manner. As the user can detect the strength
of other users’ uplink signals (through techniques sim-
ilar to those used in the ad hoc routing discovery)
[23, 24], nearby coalitions can be discovered in Phase 1
for potential cooperation. In fact, during Phase 1, each
coalition in the network can easily work out the area
within which candidates for merge can be found, as
previously explained in this section. Once the neigh-
bors are discovered, the coalitions can perform merge
operations based on the Pareto order and using the
procedure described in Algorithm 1. The complexity of
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the merge operation can grow exponentially with the
number of candidates with whom a user i is able to
merge (the number of coalitions in the neighboring area
which is in general significantly smaller than N). As
more coalitions form, the area within which candidates
are found is smaller, and, hence, the merge complexity
reduces. In addition, whenever a coalition (through
its coalition head) finds a candidate to merge with, it
automatically goes through with the merge operation,
hence, avoiding the need for finding all possible merge
forms and reducing further the complexity. Further,
each formed coalition can also internally decide to split
if its members find a split form by Pareto order. As
previously discussed, by using a control channel and the
presence of coalition heads, the distributed users can
coordinate and then cooperate using our model.
4.2 Partition stability
The result of the proposed Algorithm 1 is a network
partition composed of disjoint independent coalitions.
The stability of this network partition can be investi-
gated using the concept of a defection function [22].
Definition 6 A defection function D is a function which
associates with each partition T ofN a group of collec-
tions inN . A partition T = {T1, . . . , Tl} ofN is D-stable
if no group of players is interested in leaving T when
the players who leave can only form the collections
allowed by D.
We are interested in two defection functions [12, 22].
First, the Dhp function which associates with each par-
tition T of N the group of all partitions of N that can
form through merge or split and the Dc function which
associates with each partition T of N the group of all
collections inN . This function allows any group of play-
ers to leave the partition T ofN through any operation
and create an arbitrary collection in N . Two forms of
stability stem from these definitions: Dhp stability and a
stronger Dc stability. A partition T is Dhp-stable, if no
player in T is interested in leaving T through merge-
and-split to form other partitions inN ; while a partition
T is Dc-stable, if no player in T is interested in leaving T
through any operation (not necessarily merge or split)
to form other collections in N .
Hence, a partition is Dhp-stable if no coalition has an
incentive to split or merge. For instance, a partition T =
{T1, . . . , Tl} is Dhp-stable, if the following two necessary
and sufficient conditions are met [12, 22] ( is the
non-preference operator, opposite of ): (i)- For each
i ∈ {1, . . . , m} and for each partition {R1, . . . , Rm} of
Ti ∈ T we have {R1, . . . , Rm}  Ti, and (ii)- For each
S ⊆ {1, . . . , l} we have ⋃i∈S Ti  {Ti|i ∈ S}. Using this
definition of Dhp stability, we have
Theorem 1 Every partition resulting from our proposed
coalition formation algorithm is Dhp-stable.
Proof Consider a partition T resulting from the con-
vergence of an iteration of merge-and-split operations
such as in Algorithm 1; then no coalition in T can
leave this partition through merge or split. For instance,
assume T = {T1, . . . , Tl} is the partition resulting from
the proposed merge-and-split algorithm. If for any i ∈
{1, . . . , l} and for any partition {S1, . . . , Sm} of Ti we
assume that {S1, . . . , Sm}  Ti then the partition T can
still be modified through the application of the split rule
on Ti contradicting with the fact that T resulted from a
termination of the merge-and-split iteration; therefore
{S1, . . . , Sm}  Ti (first Dhp stability condition verified).
A similar reasoning is applicable in order to prove
that T verifies the second condition; since otherwise a
merge rule would still be applicable. 	unionsq
Furthermore, a Dc-stable partition T is characterized
by being a strongly stable partition, which satisfies the
following properties: (i)- A Dc-stable partition is Dhp-
stable, (ii)- A Dc-stable partition is a unique outcome of
any iteration of merge-and-split and, (iii)- A Dc-stable
partition T is a unique -maximal partition, that is for
all partitions T ′ = T of N , T  T ′. In the case where
 represents the Pareto order, this implies that the Dc-
stable partition T is the partition that presents a Pareto
optimal utility distribution for all the players.
Clearly, it is desirable that the network self-organizes
unto a Dc-stable partition. However, the existence of a
Dc-stable partition is not always guaranteed [22]. The
Dc-stable partition T = {T1, . . . , Tl} of the whole space
N exists if a partition of N that verifies the following
two necessary and sufficient conditions exists [22]:
1. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , l} and each pair of disjoint
coalitions S1 and S2 such that {S1 ∪ S2} ⊆ Ti we
have {S1 ∪ S2}  {S1, S2}.
2. For the partition T = {T1, . . . , Tl} a coalition G ⊂
N formed of players belonging to different Ti ∈ T
is T -incompatible if for no i ∈ {1, . . . , l} we have
G ⊂ Ti.
In summary, Dc-stability requires that for all T -
incompatible coalitions {G}[T ]  {G} where {G}[T ] =
{G ∩ Ti ∀ i ∈ {1, . . . , l}} is the projection of coalition G
on T . If no partition of N can satisfy these conditions,
then no Dc-stable partition of N exists. Nevertheless,
we have
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Lemma 1 For the proposed (N , v) PHY security coali-
tional game, the proposed Algorithm 1 converges to the
optimal Dc-stable partition, if such a partition exists.
Otherwise, the f inal network partition is Dhp-stable.
Proof The proof is a consequence of Theorem 1 and
the fact that the Dc-stable partition is a unique outcome
of any merge-and-split iteration [22] which is the case
with any partition resulting from our algorithm. 	unionsq
Moreover, for the proposed game, the existence of
the Dc-stable partition cannot be always guaranteed.
For instance, for verifying the first condition for exis-
tence of the Dc-stable partition, the users that are mem-
bers of each of the coalitions must verify the Pareto
order through their utility given by Eq. 6. Similarly,
for verifying the second condition of Dc stability, users
belonging to all T -incompatible coalitions in the net-
work must verify the Pareto order. Consequently, the
existence of such a Dc-stable partition is strongly de-
pendent on the location of the users and eavesdroppers
through the individual utilities (secrecy rates). Hence,
the existence of the Dc-stable partition is closely tied to
the location of the users and the eavesdroppers, which,
in a practical ad hoc wireless network are generally
random. However, the proposed algorithm will always
guarantee convergence to this optimal Dc-stable parti-
tion when it exists as stated in Lemma 1. Whenever a
Dc-stable partition does not exist, the coalition struc-
ture resulting from the proposed algorithm will be Dhp-
stable (no coalition or individual user is able to merge
or split any further).
5 Simulation results and analysis
For simulations, using MATLAB, a square network of
2.5 × 2.5 km is set up with the users, eavesdroppers,
and destinations randomly deployed within this area.1
The destinations are passive data sinks that serve as
receivers for the users, i.e., the transmitters. In this
network, unless stated otherwise, the users are assigned
to the closest destination. Note that, without any loss of
generality, other user-destination assignments can also
be used. For all simulations, the number of destinations
is taken as M = 2. Further, the power constraint per
slot is set to P˜ = 10 mW, the noise level is −90 dBm,
and the SNR for information exchange is ν0 = 10 dB
which implies a neighbor discovery circle radius of 1 km
1This general network setting captures a broad range of network
types ranging from ad hoc networks, to sensor networks, WLAN
networks as well as broadband or cellular networks.
per user. For the channel model, the propagation loss
is set to μ = 3. All statistical results are averaged over
the random positions of the users, eavesdroppers, and
destinations.
In Fig. 2, we show a snapshot of the network struc-
ture resulting from the proposed coalition formation
algorithm for a randomly deployed network with N =
15 users and K = 2 eavesdroppers for both DF (dashed
lines) and AF (solid lines) protocols. For DF, the users
self-organized into 6 coalitions with the size of each
coalition strictly larger than K or equal to 1. For ex-
ample, Users 4 and 15, having no suitable partners
for forming a coalition of size larger than 2, do not
cooperate. The coalition formation process is a result of
Pareto order agreements for merge (or split) between
the users. For example, in DF, coalition {5, 8, 10, 13}
formed since all the users agree on its formation due
to the fact that V({5, 8, 10, 13}) = {φ({5, 8, 10, 13}) =
[0.356 0.8952 1.7235 0.6213]} which is a clear improve-
ment on the non-cooperative utility which was 0 for
all four users (due to proximity to eavesdropper 2).
For AF, Fig. 2 shows that only users {5, 8, 13} and
users {1, 6, 7, 10} cooperate while all others remain non-
cooperative. The main reason is that, in AF, the users
need to amplify a noisy version of the signal using the
beamforming weights. As a consequence, the noise can
be highly amplified, and, for AF, cooperation is only
beneficial in very favorable conditions. For example,
coalitions {5, 8, 13} and {1, 6, 7, 10} have formed for AF
due to being far from the eavesdroppers (relatively
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Fig. 2 A snapshot of a coalitional structure resulting from our
proposed coalition formation algorithm for a network with N =
15 users, M = 2 destinations and K = 2 eavedroppers for DF
(dashed lines) and AF (solid lines)
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to the other users), hence, having a small cost for
information exchange. In contrast, for coalitions such
as {3, 11, 12}, the benefit from cooperation using AF is
small compared to the cost, and, thus, these coalitions
do not form.
In Fig. 3 we show how the algorithm handles mobility
through appropriate coalition formation decisions. For
this purpose, the network setup of Fig. 2 is considered
for the DF case while User 12 is moving horizontally
with a constant speed of 10 km/h for a period of 6.6 min,
hence, up to 1.1 km in the direction of the negative
x-axis. First of all, User 12 starts getting closer to its
receiver (destination 2), and, hence, it improves its util-
ity. In the meantime, the utilities of User 12’s partners
(Users 3 and 11) drop due to the increasing cost. As
long as the distance covered by User 12 is less than
0.2 km, the coalition of Users 3, 11 and 12 can still
bring mutual benefits to all three users. After that, split-
ting occurs by a mutual agreement and all three users
transmit independently. When User 12 moves about
0.8 km, it begins to distance itself from its receiver and
its utility begins to decrease. When the distance covered
by User 12 reaches about 1 km, it will be beneficial to
Users 12, 4, and 15 to form a 3-user coalition through
the merge rule since they improve their utilities from
φ4({4}) = 0.2577, φ12({12}) = 0.7638, and φ15({15}) =
0 in a non-cooperative manner to V({4, 12, 15}) =
{φ({4, 12, 15}) = [1.7618 1.0169 0.6227]}.
In Fig. 4 we show the performance, in terms of
average utility (secrecy rate) per user, as a function of
the network size N for both the DF and AF cases for
























User 12 splits from 
coalition {3,11,12}
Users 12, 4 and 15
merge and form
coalition {4,12,15}
Fig. 3 Self-adaptation of the network’s topology to mobility as
User 12 in Fig. 2 moves horizontally on the negative x-axis (for
DF)





























Proposed coalition formation with DF
Proposed coalition formation with AF
Fig. 4 Performance in terms of the average individual user utility
(secrecy rate) as a function of the network size N for M =
2 destinations and K = 2 eavesdroppers
a network with K = 2 eavesdroppers. First, we note
that the performance of coalition formation with DF
is increasing with the size of the network, while the
non-cooperative and the AF case present an almost
constant performance. For instance, for the DF case,
Fig. 4 shows that, by forming coalitions, the average
individual utility (secrecy rate) per user is increased at
all network sizes with the performance advantage of
DF increasing with the network size and reaching up to
25.3 and 24.4% improvement over the non-cooperative
and the AF cases, respectively, at N = 45. This is inter-
preted by the fact that, as the number of users N in-
creases, the probability of finding candidate partners to
form coalitions with, using DF, increases for every user.
Moreover, Fig. 4 shows that the performance of AF
cooperation is comparable to the non-cooperative case.
Hence, although AF relaying can improve the secrecy
rate of large clusters of nearby cooperating users when
no cost is accounted for such as in [10], in a practical
wireless network and in the presence of a cooperation
cost, the possibility of cooperation using AF for secrecy
rate improvement is rare as demonstrated in Fig. 4. This
is mainly due to the strong dependence of the secrecy
rate for AF cooperation on the channel between the
users as per Eq. 5, as well as the fact that, for AF, unless
highly favorable conditions exist (e.g. for coalitions
such as {1, 6, 7, 10} in Fig. 2) , the amplification of the
noise resulting from beamforming using AF relaying
hinders the gains from cooperation relative to the se-
crecy cost during the information exchange phase.
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In Fig. 5, we show the performance, in terms of
average utility (secrecy rate) per user, as the number
of eavesdroppers K increases for both the DF and AF
cases for a network with N = 45 users. Figure 4 shows
that, for DF, AF and the non-cooperative case, the
average secrecy rate per user decreases as more eaves-
droppers are present in the area. Moreover, for DF,
the proposed coalition formation algorithm presents a
performance advantage over both the non-cooperative
case and the AF case at all K. Nonetheless, as shown
by Fig. 5, as the number of eavesdroppers increases,
it becomes quite difficult for the users to improve
their secrecy rate through coalition formation; conse-
quently, at K = 8, all three schemes exhibit a similar
performance. Finally, similar to the results of Fig. 4,
coalition formation using the AF cooperation protocol
has a comparable performance with that of the non-
cooperative case at all K as seen in Fig. 5.
In Fig. 6, for DF cooperation, we show the average
and average maximum coalition size resulting from
the proposed algorithm as the number of users, N,
increases, for a network with K = 2 eavesdroppers.
Figure 6 shows that both the average and average max-
imum coalition size increase with the number of users.
This is mainly due to the fact that as N increases, the
number of candidate cooperating partners increases.
Further, through Fig. 6 we note that the formed coali-
tions have a small average size and a relatively large
maximum size reaching up to around 2 and 6, respec-
tively, at N = 45. Since the average coalition size is






























Proposed coalition formation with DF
Proposed coalition formation with AF
Fig. 5 Performance in terms of the average individual user utility
(secrecy rate) as a function of the number of eavesdroppers K for
N = 45 users and M = 2 destinations




















Average maximum coalition size
Fig. 6 Average and average maximum coalition size as the net-
work size N varies for M = 2 destinations and K = 2 eavesdrop-
pers and DF cooperation
below the minimum of 3 (as per Remark 1 due to
having 2 eavesdroppers) and the average maximum
coalition size is relatively large, the network structure
is thus composed of a number of large coalitions with a
few non-cooperative users.
Figure 7 shows the average (averaged over the ran-
dom positions of the users, eavesdroppers, and des-

















ns Average number of iterations
Maximum number of iterations
Fig. 7 Average and maximum number of iterations as the net-
work size N varies for for a network M = 2 destinations and
K = 2 eavesdroppers and DF cooperation
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Proposed coalition formation with DF
Non−cooperative
Fig. 8 Average individual user utility as a function of the tar-
get SNR ν0 for information exchange for a network with N =
45 users, K = 2 eavesdroppers and M = 2 destinations for DF
tinations) and maximum number of merge-and-split
iterations that occur prior to the convergence of the
proposed algorithm as the number of users, N, in-
creases, for a network with K = 2 eavesdroppers and
M = 2 destinations with DF cooperation. In Fig. 7, we
can see that the average and maximum number of it-
erations increases with the network size. This is mainly
due to the fact that as N increases, the possibilities for
cooperation increase, yielding an increased number of
merge-and-split iterations. In this figure, we remark the
the average and maximum number of merge-and-split
iterations required for the convergence vary, respec-
tively, from 1.1 and 3 at N = 5 to around 3.8 and 7
at N = 45 users. Roughly, this result implies that for a
network of N = 45 RSUs an average of about 4 merge-
and-split iterations are required before convergence,
which demonstrates that the convergence time of the
proposed algorithm is quite reasonable.
In Fig. 8, the performance, in terms of average utility
(secrecy rate) per user, of the network for different co-
operation costs, i.e., target average SNRs ν0 is assessed.
Figure 8 shows that cooperation through coalition for-
mation with DF maintains gains, in terms of average se-
crecy rate per user, at almost all costs (all SNR values).
However, as the cost increases and the required target
SNR becomes more stringent these gains decrease con-
verging further towards the non-cooperative gains at
high cost since cooperation becomes difficult due to the
cost. As seen in Fig. 8, the secrecy rate gains resulting
from the proposed coalition formation algorithm range
from 8.1% at ν0 = 20 dB to around 34.9% at ν0 = 5 dB
improvement relative to the non-cooperative case.
The proposed algorithm’s performance is further in-
vestigated in networks with N = 20 and N = 45 mobile
users for a period of 5 min in the presence of K =
2 stationary eavesdroppers. We adopt a basic random
walk mode whereby the nodes move at a constant speed
in a random direction uniformly distributed between 0
and 2π , over periods of 30 s. Also, during this period,
the proposed algorithm is run periodically every 30 s
as well. The results in terms of the frequency of merge
and split operations per minute are shown in Fig. 9 for
various speeds. As the speed increases, the frequency of
both merge and split operations per minute increases
due to the changes in the network structure incurred
by the increased mobility. These frequencies reach up
to around 19 merge operations per minute and 9 split
operations per minute for N = 45 at a speed of 72 km/h.
Finally, Fig. 9 demonstrates that the frequency of merge
and split operations increases with the network size N
as the users become more apt to finding new coopera-
tion partners when moving which results in an increased
coalition formation activity.
Figure 10 shows, for DF, how the structure of the
wireless network with N = 45 users and K = 2 mobile
eavesdroppers evolves and self-adapts over time (a
period of 5 min), while both eavesdroppers are mobile




























Merge operations per minute, N = 45 users
Split operations per minute, N = 45 users
Merge operations per minute, N = 20 users
Split operations per minute, N = 20 users
Fig. 9 Frequency of merge and split operations per minute vs.
speed of the users for different network sizes and K = 2 eaves-
droppers with DF cooperation
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with a constant velocity of 50 km/h (similar random
walk mobility of Fig. 9). The proposed coalition for-
mation algorithm is repeated periodically by the users
every 30 s, in order to provide self-adaptation to mo-
bility. First, the users self-organize into 22 coalitions
after the occurrence of 10 merge and split operations
at time t = 0. As time evolves, through adequate merge
and split operations the network structure is adapted
to the mobility of eavesdroppers. For example, at time
t = 1 min, through a total of 6 operations constituted
of 5 merge and 1 split, the network structure changes
from a partition of 26 coalitions back to a partition
of 22 coalitions. Further, at t = 3 min, no merge or
split operations occur, and, thus, the network structure
remain unchanged. In summary, Fig. 10 illustrates how
the users can take adequate merge or split decisions
to adapt the network structure to the mobility of the
eavesdroppers.
In order to assess the impact of the users-destination
assignment scheme on the performance, in Fig. 11, we
show the average utility (secrecy rate) per user, as a
function of the network size N for both the DF and AF
cases for a network with K = 2 eavesdroppers when the
users are randomly assigned to their destinations. First,
compared with Fig. 4, we can see that, by randomly
assigning the users to their destinations, the average
utility per user resulting from both the cooperative (DF
and AF) and non-cooperative cases is smaller than that
achieved when the users are assigned to their closest
destination. The main reason behind this result is that,

















































Number of merge and split operations
Fig. 10 Evolution over time for a network with N = 45 users,
M = 2 destinations, and K = 2 eavesdroppers with DF coopera-
tion when the eavesdroppers are moving with a speed of 50 km/h



























Proposed coalition formation with DF
Proposed coalition formation with AF
Fig. 11 Performance in terms of the average individual user
utility (secrecy rate) as a function of the network size N for
M = 2 destinations and K = 2 eavesdroppers when the users are
assigned randomly to their destinations
when assigned to their closest destination, the users
have a better channel as per the considered channel
model, and, thus, their resulting secrecy rates are bet-
ter. Nonetheless, Fig. 11 demonstrates that, when the
users are assigned randomly to their destination, the
advantage of coalition formation is significantly higher
than in the case of Fig. 4. For instance, for the DF
case, Fig. 11 shows that the performance advantage
of coalition formation with DF reaches up to 70.3
and 60.6% improvement over the non-cooperative and
the AF cases, respectively, at N = 45. Moreover, even
with the AF case, Fig. 11 shows that up to 6% of
improvement relatively to the non-cooperative case is
also possible at N = 45 users, which is better than the
performance of AF in Fig. 4. Hence, Fig. 11 clearly
shows that, even with a random assignment of the users
to their destination, the proposed coalition formation
algorithm can yield significant gains compared to the
non-cooperative case, notably with DF cooperation.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have studied the user behavior, topol-
ogy, and dynamics of a network of users that interact
in order to improve their secrecy rate through both
decode-and-forward and amplify-and-forward cooper-
ation. We formulated the problem as a non-transferable
Mobile Netw Appl (2011) 16:231–245 245
coalitional game, and proposed a distributed and adap-
tive coalition formation algorithm. Through the pro-
posed algorithm, the mobile users are able to take
a distributed decision to form or break cooperative
coalitions through well suited rules from cooperative
games while maximizing their secrecy rate taking into
account various costs for information exchange. We
have characterized the network structure resulting from
the proposed algorithm, studied its stability, and ana-
lyzed the self-adaptation of the topology to environ-
mental changes such as mobility. Simulation results
have shown that, for decode-and-forward, the proposed
algorithm allowed the users to self-organize while im-
proving the average secrecy rate per user up to 25.3
and 24.4% (for a network with 45 users) relative to
the non-cooperative and amplify-and-forward cases,
respectively.
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